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Abstract  
Covert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is 
remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about 
what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing 
criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop 
a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case 
of “the golden age of CIA operations”. The socially constructed nature of success has important 
implications not just for evaluating covert actions but also for using, and defending against, them.  
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Covert action is generally understood as state activity to influence conditions abroad where it is 
intended that the role of the sponsor will neither be apparent nor acknowledged publicly. 1 From 
Russian interference in the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections to American support for 
 
1 We use a broad definition to take into account the contested nature and scope of unacknowledged 
state interventions in a variety of contexts. Nevertheless, our definition reflects a tendency in the 
academic debate to conceive of covert action through the US prism. Title 50 § 3093 of the US Code 
defines it as ‘an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or 
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not 
be apparent or acknowledged publicly’. For further discussion of the definition of covert action see Len 
Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, Intelligence and National Security, 
19:2 (2004), pp. 322-341. On the constructed and evolving nature of intelligence practices more broadly 
see Hager Ben Jaffel, Alvina Hoffmann, Oliver Kearns, and Sebastian Larsson, ‘Collective Discussion: 
Toward Critical Approaches to Intelligence as a Social Phenomenon’, International Political Sociology, 
14:3 (2020), pp. 323–344. 
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Syrian rebel groups, covert action has featured prominently in recent international security 
discourse. As the United States debates the merits of covert action against Iran and Venezuela, 
and covert competition with China, critics fear that it is back on the agenda.2   
 The impact of covert action, and intelligence more generally, on international relations is 
under-theorized.3 Evaluating the success of covert action, especially intangible influence 
operations, poses significant challenges – something that even those with full access to classified 
records agree.4 Nonetheless, such challenges, including how to isolate agency and measure 
effects, do not prevent observers from labelling particular operations as successes or failures.5 
Under-theorization poses a significant intellectual and policy problem. Failing to 
recognize the subjective nature of judgements when evaluating actions can lead to unrealistic 
expectations about what covert action can – and cannot – achieve as a policy option. 
Overestimating the “hidden hand” can lead to conspiracism about foreign actors, undermine 
trust in democratic institutions, and provide a convenient scapegoat for domestic divisions. At 
the same time, “success” in covert action can today be publicly contested as never before. The 
advent of new information and communication technologies and consequent proliferation of 
 
2 Benjamin Dennison, ‘Stay Out of the Regime Change Business’, War on The Rocks (2020) available at: 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/stay-out-of-the-regime-change-business/ accessed 20 April 2021; 
Michael Poznansky and Mindy Haas, ‘As US-China Competition Grows, Will Covert Regime Change Make 
a Return?’, The Diplomat (2020) available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/as-us-china-
competition-grows-will-covert-regime-change-make-a-return/ accessed 20 April 2021. 
3 Christopher Andrew ‘Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation'’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 19:2 (2004), pp. 170-84. 
4 “Note on Covert Action”, Office of the Historian, FRUS, 1977-1980 XX Eastern Europe, p.xxxix. Likewise, 
one of the leading Soviet disinformation specialists, Ladislav Bittman, conceded that “you have no 
reliable measurement device”. Quoted in Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of 
Disinformation and Political Warfare (London: Profile, 2020), p. 430. 
5 See for example datasets used by Lindsey O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). For a more historical qualitative approach highlighting 
failure see Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Penguin, 2012). 
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narratives about foreign policy events allow citizens to scrutinize and debate policy decisions, 
including covert action past and present, in myriad ways.6 As scholars of policy evaluation note, 
‘claims of policy success and counterclaims of policy failure have become a key currency of 
political competition.’7 Put simply, it is imperative to interrogate the dynamics of “success” when 
debating the use of covert action.   
 Our argument here is as follows. Under-theorization creates confusion about what 
constitutes success. Second, covert action is elusive – and not just because of secrecy. It is difficult 
to contain conceptually and analytically. As a consequence, perceptions are equally, if not more, 
important than actual outcomes and impact. Either way, outcomes and impact are constructed 
and continually debated by researchers, journalists, practitioners and policymakers. Success is 
neither binary nor exogenous to covert action. A successful covert action is one that has been 
labeled a success by salient observers – and that label has stuck. Interestingly, both sponsor and 
target have incentives to collude in the construction of success. 
 To advance our argument, this article deconstructs covert action success. It begins by 
critically reviewing “success” in the existing literature before developing an intersubjective model 
to demonstrate that success is multi-dimensional, interpreted, and constructed through 
discourse. We then offer a definition of success which draws out, and makes coherent, diverse 
existing assumptions, before applying this to a case study of the CIA’s “golden age of covert 
operations”.  
 
6 For discussion see Rory Cormac and Oliver Daddow, ‘Covert Action Failure and Fiasco Construction: 
William Hague’s 2011 Libyan Venture’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25:5 (2018), pp. 690-707. 




Covert Action “Success” 
 
The consensual definition of covert action highlights two key criteria. Covert actions are an 
instrument of foreign policy (they seek to influence events abroad) and the sponsor is unapparent 
or unacknowledged.8  Research on covert action tends to focus on three broad types of activities 
presented according to their degree of violence: propaganda; political action, such as funneling 
money to a political party or fomenting riots; and paramilitary action, from training insurgent 
groups to assassination.  
Not all states use covert action, and those that do conceive of this practice in different 
ways. The US approach highlights ‘plausible deniability’ – a doctrine that allows senior officials 
neither to confirm nor deny responsibility for covert actions.9 Soviet officials used the term 
‘active measures’ to cover a broader spectrum of overt and covert activities, and have more 
readily embraced implausible deniability.10 Although far more restrained, the British similarly blur 
the boundaries between covert action and routine foreign policy as well as between intelligence 
coverage and so-called ‘effects’.11 French practitioners do not use the term covert but talk about 
action clandestine, and their dedicated unit – Service Action – specializes in paramilitary 
 
8 This definition is largely inspired from the official US definition. 
9 Michael Poznansky, ‘Revisiting Plausible Deniability’, Journal of Strategic Studies (online 2020), pp. 1–
23. 
10 Richard Shulz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (McLean: 
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), p. 193; David Gioe, Michael S. Goodman and David S. Frey, ‘Unforgiven: 
Russian intelligence vengeance as political theatre and strategic messaging’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 34:4 (2019), pp. 561–75. 
11 Rory Cormac, Disrupt and Deny. Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of Foreign Policy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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operations.12 These linguistic and organizational variations reveal that government officials 
conceive of a relatively common set of practices differently.  
Like definitions of covert actions, knowledge of the operations themselves is in many 
ways socially constructed. The US approach has dominated scholarly research and affected 
common understandings of covert action. This has led to an exaggerated importance of plausible 
deniability and too stark a divide between overt and covert activity. Famous US examples such 
as the CIA’s rescue of hostages in Iran in 1979, portrayed in the 2012 film Argo, have also 
encouraged observers to conceive of covert actions as discrete operations with clear beginnings 
and ends. In reality, in both Iran and other countries where US covert actions pursued regime 
change during the Cold War, internal dissent coexisted with external covert sponsorship making 
it difficult to isolate the covert action and its impact. Covert action often complements larger 
overt state action, and it is misleading to narrowly focus on the former in analysis. In fact, a 
guiding principle of CIA covert action is that, to be effective, it must harness existing conditions 
in a target and must be accompanied by broader US diplomatic effort. As a result, covert action 
and its parameters are difficult to contain analytically.13 This is problematic because how scholars 
define covert action and its parameters impacts upon how they evaluate its effects and success.  
Armed with more historical evidence than ever before, International Relations scholars 
are increasingly examining the role of covert action as a form of state interventionism. They 
 
12 Olivier Chopin and Benjamin Oudet, Renseignement et Sécurité (Paris: Armand Colin, 2019), pp. 138-
63; Alain de Marolles, ‘La Tradition Française de l’Action Invisible’, in Pierre Lacoste (ed.), Le 
Renseignement à la française (Paris: Economica, 1999), pp.337–38. 
13 Rid, (2020), p. 432. 
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interrogate, among other matters, the causes and conduct of covert regime change,14 the role of 
secrecy in foreign policy and statecraft,15 and the relationship between covert action and 
democratic norms.16 Despite such progress, the literature offers little explicit investigation of a 
fundamental question: how to define success?  
 One means used to assess – or more often demonstrate – success is through counting 
outputs. For propaganda operations, this includes the number of articles surreptitiously placed 
in foreign newspapers; for political action, the amount of bribery undertaken; and for 
paramilitary action, the number of terrorists killed by drone strikes. Practitioners, often trying to 
quantify success in order to attract more funding, tend to use this approach. For example, the 
Reagan White House evaluated covert action against the Soviets primarily by monitoring 
distribution of propaganda material.17 These outputs offer a limited understanding of success; 
they struggle to account for the impact achieved. Relying on them achieves little beyond allowing 
those conducting the covert action to claim success. 
 
14 O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change; Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in Secret Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Dov Levin, ‘A Vote for Freedom? The Effects of Partisan 
Electoral Interventions on Regime Type’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63:4 (2019), pp. 839-68. 
15 Austin Carson, ‘Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the 
Korean War’, International Organization, 70:1 (2016), pp. 103-31; Rory Cormac, and Richard J. Aldrich, 
‘Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible Deniability’, International Affairs, 94:3 (2018), pp. 
477-94. 
16 Michael Poznansky, ‘Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace’, International 
Studies Quarterly, 59:4 (2015), pp. 815–26. 
17 CIA, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, untitled paper, (13 November 1987), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, available at:  <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-
88v06/d93> (accessed 13 May 2020). 
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Intelligence scholars working on covert action think carefully about how to ensure 
success. The literature offers important insights into factors which improve chances of success,18 
whether covert action can be just,19 and how to ensure effective oversight of covert actions.20  
Much of this discussion involves checklists to ensure success rather than breaking down what 
constitutes success in the first place. Instead, success is implicit in an amorphous range of 
indicators. These include legality, alignment with national security interests and foreign policy 
objectives and values, whether covert action is appropriately funded, reasonable probability of 
success, whether methods are commensurate with objectives, whether local actors have input 
on outcomes, and whether intelligence officials have properly assessed the risks involved.21 
These checklists are important – especially at the operational level – and speak to various 
dimensions of success and their political ramifications. However, they are under-theorized: 
resting on implicit assumptions of success and struggling to reveal or explain how it is 
constructed. The relationship between some indicators (such as legality and vague notions of 
“values”) and success is not explicit, whilst other indicators (such as the probability of success or 
 
18 John Breen ‘Covert Action and Unintended Consequences’, InterAgency Journal 8:3 (2017), pp. 106-
117; Loch K. Johnson, ‘National Security Intelligence in the United States: A Performance Checklist’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 26:5 (2011), pp. 612-13; Gregory Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits 
of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, 1987), ch.6; William Daugherty, Executive 
Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 
ch.3. 
19 Alison M. Shelton, ‘Framing the Oxymoron: A New Paradigm for Intelligence Ethics’, Intelligence and 
International Security, 26:1 (2011), pp. 23-45; James Barry, ‘Covert Action Can be Just’, Orbis, 37:3 
(1993), pp. 375-390. 
20 Jennifer D. Kibbe, ‘Covert action and the Pentagon’, Intelligence and National Security, 22:1 (2007), 
pp. 57-74; Genevieve Lester, When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), pp. 82-89; Loch K. Johnson, Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 461. 
21 For examples see, Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), pp. 111-
14; Daugherty (2009), pp. 4-7; Treverton, (1987) pp. 174-6; Armin Krishnan, Why Paramilitary 
Operations Fail (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2018), pp. 12-15; Breen (2017), pp. 106-17. 
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consequences of failure) rest on assumptions of success and failure which are not explicitly 
defined leaving a circular argument. Perhaps most importantly, these checklists lie in tension with 
the more explicit, rationalist, and narrow understanding of success which most scholars 
eventually fall back on: whether, as the CIA’s chief historian, David Robarge, put it, covert action 
accomplished the policy objectives it was intended to help implement.22  However, this is itself 
problematic in so far as it captures only a slice of the many other aspects linked to success, such 
as legality and values, implicitly underpinning the covert action checklists. It further assumes a 
rational state that defines clear and measurable policy objectives and links them to covert actions 
before conducting them.  
A recent quantitative turn advances the rationalist approach to measuring outcomes 
against objectives further.23 These studies offer useful findings which can then inform 
judgements of success. They ask important questions about the longer-term consequences of 
covert action, even if those consequences are empirically narrow (such as impact on levels of 
democracy or occurrence of militarized conflict).24 However, they too suffer limitations not least 
in treating the initial success or failure of each covert action in a binary manner from which 
longer-term effects are then derived, and in making assumptions about objectives, temporal 
 
22 Breen (2017),pp. 106-17.  
23See for example, Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke, ‘You Can’t Always Get What You 
Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations’, International 
Security, 41:2 (2016), pp. 43–89; O’Rourke (2020); Levin (2019). 
24 See for example, Dov Levin’s argument that covert electoral interference increases the target’s 
susceptibility to democratic breakdown. Levin (2019). 
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parameters, and agency of each covert action.25 This can undermine claims about effects, 
potentially leading to a false sense of certainty.  
Overall, covert action literature is under-theorized and struggles to articulate success in 
an explicit and coherent manner. Some works recognize amorphous normative factors, but most 
fall back on rationalist attempts to measure outcomes against objectives. Almost all take a 
positivist approach, seeing success and failure as independent from authors’ and key 
stakeholders’ knowledge of a covert action, and hence objectively measurable. Analysis often 
takes “success” as self-evident, focusing instead on causes or consequences, and lessons to be 
learnt. There is little attempt to question ontological and epistemological assumptions, or to 
recognize the importance of competing perceptions and power relations. 
The conventional approach underplays the subjective nature of success as a judgement 
or label rather than an inherent attribute. Judging success by measuring outcomes against 
objectives is analytically problematic, not least because policy goals can be ambiguous and shift 
over time. This is especially the case in the realm of covert action because of the ambiguities in 
planning created by the need for secrecy.26 Even the existence of presidential findings – a form 
of directive used since 1974 to justify US covert actions to Congress – did little to provide clear 
and measurable goals against which to judge success. For example, a declassified 1980 finding 
 
25 See discussion in Michael Poznansky, Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke, 
‘Correspondence: Friends, Foes, and Foreign-Imposed Regime Change’, International Security, 42:2 
(2017), pp. 191-95. 
26 O’Rourke (2020), p. 54. 
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authorized covert action ‘for the purpose of resisting Cuban supported […] subversive and 
terrorist activities in Honduras’.27 How much resisting constitutes success?   
Other declassified documents relating to this operation discuss intercepting the flow of 
arms through Honduras and preventing the establishment of guerrilla infrastructure in 
Honduras.28 Although this gives sense of “how” the objective is to be achieved, the prioritisation 
of tasks, the specific means to be used, and possible measures of success are not specified. How 
much interception of arms and prevention constitutes success? In such cases, practitioners and 
scholars are left unable to judge what exactly should be achieved and tempted to impose their 
values ‘to make it possible to compare performance with aspiration’.29 To further complicate 
matters, according to a former senior CIA counter-terrorism officer, measuring success of a 
covert action frequently becomes an emotional issue for those in Congress responsible for its 
oversight. They ‘want’ to see an action they have supported succeed – using whatever favourable 
metrics are available.30 
Foreign policy scholarship usefully emphasizes the objective and subjective nature of 
success. Johnson and Tierney use the term “score-keeping” to describe assessments that focus 
on material gains and losses, and the achievement of material aims. Any examination needs to 
take into account the respective importance and difficulty assigned to gains and aims – which 
 
27 President Carter, ‘Presidential Finding’, 16 April 1980, available at: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v15/d355 accessed 20 April 2021. 
28 ‘Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant 
for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Aaron)’, 11 February 1980: available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-
80v15/d409> accessed 20 April 2021; ‘Memorandum for the Record’, 12 February 1980, available at: 
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v15/d410>, accessed 20 April 2021. 
29 B. Guy Peters, American Public Policy: Promise and Performance (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2012), 
p. 161. 
30 Calder Walton interview with former senior CIA official at NCTC (19 March 2021). 
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adds subjectivity. Observers interpret the importance and difficulty of aims and gains, but ‘cannot 
say for sure that one material gain is more important than another’.31 Having employed a 
benchmark for success – usually a perception of the objectives and what success would look like 
against them – policy evaluators then assess incoming information to determine whether this 
has been achieved. Both of these perceptions suffer cultural, political and psychological biases 
that scholarly analysis should seek to identify.32  
 
An Evaluation Model for Covert Action  
 
To address these issues, we adopt an intersubjective approach, which explores how particular 
understandings and interpretations of realities are constructed and legitimated to become a 
dominant discourse. Intersubjective scholarship recognizes that success is constructed as a 
political act, as a label to be applied rather than objective facts exogenous from the policy events 
observed.33 Success is not an inherent attribute of policy but a judgement about policy that exists 
through discourse. This judgement is a complex process compounded by ‘wildly different 
 
31 Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in 
International Politic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p.30. 
32 Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: Victory and Defeat in US Military 
Operations’ in Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.) Understanding Victory and Defeat in 
Contemporary War (Routledge: Abingdon, 2007). 
33 Mark Bovens and Paul ‘t Hart, Understanding Policy Fiascoes (London: Transaction, 1996). See also, 
Mark Bovens and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Revisiting the Study of Policy Failures’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
23:5 (2016), pp. 653-66. 
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perceptions and post-hoc inquiries often accused of politicization and bias’.34 An intersubjective 
approach therefore studies ‘how something comes to be seen’ as a “success”.35 
We develop a model to evaluate covert actions by revealing how they came to be seen as 
successes. Figure 1 represents this model as three concentric circles. The circle at the core distills 
three dimensions of “success”: programmatic, process and political.36 Despite hinting at these 
different dimensions, most intelligence literature falls back on programmatic evaluation and 
struggles to reconcile tension between the three. Our framework makes these differences 
explicit and distills them to increase conceptual clarity and coherence. 
 
 
34 Allan McConnell, ‘A Public Policy Approach to Understanding the Nature and Causes of Foreign Policy 
Failure’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23:5 (2016), p.667. 
35 Andreas Kruck, Kai Oppermann, and Alexander Spencer, ‘Introduction: Mistakes and Failures in 
International Relations’ in Kruck, Oppermann, and Spencer (eds.) Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in 
International Relations, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2018) pp. 4,6. 
36 Marsh and McConnell, ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’, Public Administration, 
88:2 (2010), pp. 564-83. 
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Figure 1. The social construction of success 
 
The programmatic dimension of success covers whether a covert action met its 
objectives, which can be tactical or strategic, the gains made, and the impact achieved. Used on 
its own, this approach is problematic because it is difficult to measure objectively and lies in 
tension with normative and ideational definitions of success. 
Process success refers to the manner in which the state went about achieving policy 
objectives. Process can create or undermine legitimacy and is therefore an important marker of 
success. It includes whether a covert action was planned inside approved channels; whether it 
enjoyed a broad coalition of support amongst those who “needed to know”; and whether 
bureaucratic infighting delayed or altered a covert action.37 Beyond planning and authorization, 
 













a process failure might involve the operation going wrong somehow, whether by breach of 
secrecy, death or arrest of an agent, or an unfavorable impact on cognate activities such as 
intelligence gathering. This dimension also includes factors such as lesson learning and 
innovation,38 both of which are significant for covert actions that rely, to an extent, on 
experimentation, creativity, and trial and error. Many of these are implicitly recognised in the 
checklists prevalent in the existing literature. For example, scholars such as Johnson and Barry,39 
as well as practitioners such as William Webster,40 emphasise in importance of authorization, 
oversight and legal review in liberal democracies.  
Political outcomes for both the sponsoring state and target populations offer a third 
dimension of covert action evaluation. Success affects the electoral prospects or reputation of a 
sponsoring party and is indicated by ‘political upheaval (press coverage, parliamentary 
investigations, political fatalities, litigation) or lack of it, and changes in generic patterns of 
political legitimacy (public satisfaction with policy or confidence in authorities and public 
institutions)’.41 This is implicit in the above mentioned checklists too, for example in alignment 
with “values” and whether the covert action is acceptable to the broader public if exposed. 
Political evaluation is particularly important regarding covert action given the controversial 
nature of the subject. Covert action can be perceived as a political success if it enhanced – or at 
 
38 Marsh and McConnell (2010), p. 573. 
39 James Barry, ‘Covert Action Can be Just’, Orbis, 37:3 (1993), pp. 375-390. 
40 Johnson, (2011) p.613. 
41 Mark Bovens, Paul ’t Hart and B.G. Peters (eds), Success and Failure in Public Governance: A 
Comparative Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), p.21. 
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least did not damage – the reputation of the sponsoring government at home and abroad and/or 
it did not generate so much domestic criticism that it damaged its ability to govern.42   
The second circle of our framework shows how observers interpret these three core 
dimensions. Here the model draws on Johnson and Tierney to emphasize how observers’ 
mindsets, salient events, and social pressures shape their evaluation. Mindsets are the product 
of constraints on information processing, emotional states, past experiences and cultural 
tradition. Salient events, such as the elimination of a leader and the overthrow of a regime, can 
have disproportionate effects on perceptions of victory or success. Social pressure, in the form 
of elite, media, and in our case intelligence agencies’ manipulations, influences perceptions of 
success and the relative value observers ascribe to various dimensions.43  
Perceptions of success and failure are not just shaped by material realities, but also by 
ideational factors. Ideational factors form the building blocks of competing interpretations of 
covert actions, which are observable through narratives and counter-narratives. The third and 
broadest circle in Figure 1 is where multiple interpretations are actuated and become visible 
through narratives of “success” and counter-narratives of qualified success or failure. This level 
uses scholarship on narrative analysis to offer insight into how a covert action came to be seen 
as successful – and by whom. It focuses on how evaluation is enacted by analyzing the 
constitutive parts of a compelling story: its setting, characters and plot.44 Each part − shaped by 
 
42 McConnell (2016), p. 674. 
43 Johnson and Tierney (2006), pp.38-75. 
44 Policy discourses or narratives construct how problems and subjects are understood. They construct 
setting, characters and plot – and ultimately available policy options. Carina van de Wetering, ‘Policy 
Discourses and Security Issues: US Foreign Policy Toward India During the Clinton 
Administration’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13:2, (2017), pp.460–479; Kai Oppermann and Alexander 
 
17 
mindsets, salient events and social pressures − influences perceptions of programmatic, process, 
and political outcomes. Audiences have traditionally understood covert action as stories, but 
scholarship on covert action has shied away from examining who tells these stories, and how 
elites frame their settings, characters such as allies and enemies, and plots or crises. 45 
Following the narrative turn in foreign policy analysis, our framework places perceptions 
at the centre of evaluations of success by drawing attention to the way in which salient actors 
interpret events and how cognitive and cultural aspects frame understanding of outcomes in 
international politics. Competition between narratives and counter-narratives eventually leads 
to some form of consensus – a dominant narrative – and one interpretation of events as a success 
or failure becomes social fact.46  A dominant narrative is one that resonates with salient observers 
in the society of the sponsoring country and in other relevant societies, for example in the target 
state, but also in allied and adversary countries.47 Such observers can be construed as an elite 
that includes intelligence practitioners and policymakers with access to information who speak 
 
Spencer, “Telling stories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 23:5 (2016), pp. 689-90; Deserai Crow and Michael Jones, ‘Narratives as tools for 
influencing policy change’, Policy & Politics, 46:2 (2018), pp. 217-234; Ronald R. Krebs, ‘How Dominant 
Narratives Rise and Fall: Military conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus’, International 
Organization, 69:4 (2015), p. 811; Kathrin Bachleitner, ‘Diplomacy with Memory: How the Past Is 
Employed for Future Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 15:4, (2019), pp.492–508. 
45 See Johnson and Tierney (2006); Alexandra Homolar, ‘Rebels without a conscience: The evolution of 
the rogue states narrative in US security policy’, European Journal of International Relations, 14:4 
(2010): pp.705-727 
46 Oppermann and Spencer (2016), p.686; Cristian Cantir and Juliet Karboo, ‘Contested Roles and 
Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory’, Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 8:1 (2012), pp.5-24; Jelena Subotić, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy 
Change’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 12:4 (2016), p.615. 
47 Leslie E. Wehner and Cameron Thies, ‘Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic 
Contestation of Roles’, International Studies Review, 16:3 (2014), p.421. On the narrative approach and 
ordering process see also Annick T.R. Wibben, Feminist security studies: a narrative approach (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 43-64. 
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from a position of political authority and legitimacy to a large audience; journalists who speak to 
a similarly large audience; and, to a smaller extent, scholars who influence the intellectual 
debate. Dominant narratives, more than material realities, determine the extent to which covert 
actions are constructed as successful for a certain period of time.48 
A covert action is successful when salient observers judge that an operation met the goals 
that proponents set out to achieve; when these judgements have stuck; and when there is 
minimal criticism of the way the state achieved this and of the political consequences. Minimal 
criticism among relevant domestic and international audiences is a sign of narrative dominance. 
For example, a minority of observers could consider that an action is more of a failure by giving 
prominence to the negative effects it had on the politics of the target country as opposed to 
those of the sponsoring country. However, the limited number and reach of such critiques would 
not be sufficient to seriously challenge and overturn the dominant narrative of success and the 
sense of legitimacy this helps state actors to establish.49 If criticism becomes more widespread, 
because of new evidence or socio-political trends, it might eventually turn what was perceived 
as a qualified success into a form of failure.50 These discursive dynamics tend to favor binary 
categorization. It is easier, more gripping and impactful to frame a story as a success or a failure 
from which a moral should be drawn. The case for lessons to be learnt is less likely to convince 
when the action was neither a success nor a failure. In practice, however, the existence of 
 
48 Leslie E. Wehner, ‘The narration of role in foreign policy analysis’, Journal of International Relations 
and Development 23:2 (2020), pp.359-384. 
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50 On the mediating role of mass media (between leaders and public opinion views) see: Matthew A. 
Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, ‘The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign 
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multiple narratives suggests that most successes and failures are qualified. Having outlined a new 
framework for evaluating covert action, the article now turns to a single case study to develop it. 
 
The “Golden Age” of CIA operations 
 
The so-called “Golden Age” of the CIA, which lasted from its establishment in 1947 to the failed 
invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, is useful to demonstrate how a series of covert operations 
came to be seen as successful. Our case study selection follows a convenience sampling strategy 
that focuses on a prominent case. CIA covert actions are by far the most well-known and publicly 
discussed. This can be related to the interventionist trend in US foreign policy, but also to the 
relative transparency of its intelligence community which facilitates scholarly research and to the 
reach of American spy fiction which draws public attention.51 This means that a wealth of 
material is available to examine discourses on covert action from the perspective of salient 
observers in government (through archives and public statements), the media (we restrict our 
analysis to press coverage) and academia. The “Golden Age” is remembered as a period in which 
the Agency used a range of covert methods, from propaganda and political influence to 
paramilitary activity, to support US foreign policy goals. Specifically, we draw on three of the 
most well-known CIA “successes”: attempts to influence the Italian elections in 1948, the Iranian 
coup of 1953, and the 1954 Guatemala coup.  
 
51 On this last point see Simon Willmetts, In Secrecy’s Shadow: The OSS and CIA in Hollywood Cinema 
1941-1979 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). 
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The conventional narrative of CIA “success” proposes a well-known script. The CIA 
covertly interfered in the Italian elections to prevent a communist-dominated popular front from 
defeating the pro-Western government. This included covert propaganda, from coordinated 
letter-writing campaigns to forged documents, and covert funding of the Christian Democrat 
Party, alongside extensive overt efforts such as attempts to link future US aid to the defeat of the 
communists. The Christian Democrats won the election.  
In August 1953, the US and UK covertly sponsored the removal the Iranian prime minister, 
Mohammad Mossadeq. The British had begun to subvert his government back in autumn 1951, 
after he nationalized Iranian oil, and then joined forces with the Americans in spring 1953. The 
operation involved bribing army officers, journalists and politicians; covert propaganda; and 
assembling thugs to demonstrate against Mossadeq. It initially unraveled, but, after four days of 
confusion, Mossadeq was arrested.  
The following year, the CIA sponsored a coup replacing the democratically elected 
Guatemalan leader, Jacobo Árbenz, with a military dictatorship. The CIA funded, armed and 
trained a paramilitary force and then used psychological warfare, including a black radio station, 
to amplify its successes and intimidate the government. Although the paramilitary force achieved 
little material effect, Árbenz resigned in June 1954.  
It is helpful to consider these operations together because their position relative to each 
other in the chronological narrative of the CIA perpetuates an impression of success. Historians 
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traditionally perceive Italy as a springboard to bigger operations, such as Iran. Guatemala was 
approved following the Iranian “success” and directly influenced a host of other operations.52  
The phrase “Golden Age”, denoting success and free rein, appeared in newspaper articles 
as early as the 1960s,53 and then scholarly works from the late 1980s into the 2000s.54 CIA 
veterans have also referred to a “golden age”,55 whilst the CIA uses the expression – albeit 
carefully – to refer to the directorship of Allen Dulles (1953-1961): ‘his tenure is often said to be 
a “golden age” for CIA.’56 In 2009, the CIA’s chief historian wrote that the ‘the CIA enjoyed what 
was widely regarded as a “golden age”’ in the 1950s, largely owing to it ‘its perceived operational 
prowess’.57 Overall, as one historian put it, ‘the argument that the 1950s served as a form of 
“golden age” for the CIA – has come to dominate historical, and indeed cultural, representations 
of the Agency’s role in the early-Cold War era.’58  
 
52 For influential examples see Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and 
the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins 1996), pp.171–73; Rodhri 
Jefferys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989) pp.50–52. 
For a more critical account see Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, 
Secret Warfare and the CIA 1945-53 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 
53 Joseph Kraft, ‘Insight and Outlook Left in the Cold’, Washington Post and Times Herald, 31 January 
1966, available at:  https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00001R000100120074-
3.pdf accessed 20 April 2021; ‘They Kept the Money’, 20 July 1967, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75-00149r000700460005-3, accessed 21 
April 2021; ‘Should the U.S. Fight Secret War?’, Harpers, 1 September 1984, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201250008-5.pdf  
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35:2 (2000), p.259. 
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International History Review, 35:2 (2013), pp. 337-55; Victor Marchetti, a veteran officer, and John 
Marks in The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p.27. 
56 Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/allen-dulles-becomes-
dci.html accessed 15 December 2020. 
57 David Robarge, ‘CIA in the Spotlight: The Central Intelligence Agency and Public Accountability’, 
Journal of Intelligence History, 9:1-2 (2009), p. 114 
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Discussions on Latin America, 1953–61’, Intelligence and National Security, 26:2-3 (2011), p. 269. 
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The “Golden Age” has had a long afterlife in the public discourse of US intelligence, 
continuing to set the CIA as an important and historically powerful actor in international affairs. 
In short, it became social fact. To unpack this construction our analysis now turns to narratives – 
and related interpretations – of programmatic, process and political success. We focus on 
narratives primarily because they are the most apparent and visible way in which mindsets, 
salient events and social pressures come to frame different dimensions of success. 
 
The dominant narrative of success 
 
The dominant narrative of the “Golden Age” is set in the context of the so-called Cold War 
consensus which pits an aggressive and expansionist communist bloc led by the Soviet Union 
against the free world led by the United States.59 This interpretation marginalizes both the view 
that the United States overstated the Soviet Union’s expansionist threat and the impact on 
domestic population in target states.  
The specific covert actions that contributed to this “Golden Age” also have their own 
settings. Geographically, narratives focus on planning in Washington D.C., and US presence in or 
around the target country. Temporally, dominant narratives use beginnings and ends – by no 
means inevitable – which emphasize CIA gains, power and impact. For example, beginning the 
Iranian coup with President Eisenhower’s green light in spring 1953 rather than UK subversion in 
autumn 1951 bestows greater ownership of the covert action to the CIA. Beginning the 
 
59 Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), p. 4. 
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Guatemala narrative in the early 1950s overlooks a ‘centuries-old cycle of progressive change 
and conservative reaction’, thereby overplaying the narrative of an unprecedented communist 
attempt to target a country in the US backyard.60 The setting also frames a specific set of policy 
parameters: the dominant narrative tends to focus on the covert rather than the overt action it 
complemented. This overplays the impact of covert activity despite the difficulties in knowing 
whether it was the covert action which provided a margin in, say, Italy rather than the much 
larger overt program of US support, not least through the Marshall Plan.  
Lead characters in “Golden Age” covert actions tend to be US policymakers and CIA 
officers. They are often portrayed – whether critically or supportively – as powerful, enjoying 
minimal oversight, and getting the job the done. American intelligence officer Kermit Roosevelt, 
for example, went off script and acted without authorization as the Iranian coup unraveled but 
is remembered for improvising a solution. For Gregory Treverton, one of the most influential 
writers on covert action, ‘Roosevelt turned what might have been a disaster in Iran in 1953 into 
stunning success.’ This success was partly because, again according to Treverton, the CIA ‘sees 
itself as being in the business of taking risks’. 61 The CIA mindset and bureaucratic interests 
shaped its own narrative of success by emphasizing process and programmatic achievements. By 
contrast, intelligence historians traditionally portray Prime Minister Mossadeq as a pajama-clad 
effeminate and the shah as an oscillating Hamlet figure.62  
 
60 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-54 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) pp. 8-9. 
61 Treverton, ‘Covert Action: From “Covert” to Overt’, Daedalus, 116:2 (1987), p. 108. 
62 See Mary Ann Heiss, ‘Real Men Don’t Wear Pajamas: Anglo-American Cultural Perceptions of 
Mohammed Mossadeq and the Iranian Oil Nationalizations Dispute’ in Peter Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss 
(eds) Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945 (Columbus OH: Ohio 
State University Press, 2001). 
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The setting and characters shape the plot: the CIA successfully interfered in each country. 
The CIA achieved a set of programmatic successes, demonstrating operational gains, potency and 
impact. There is remarkable convergence here even among competing narratives. On Italy for 
example, journalists and political activists criticize CIA operations; former CIA officers celebrated 
them; whilst scholars sought to place it into a chronology of Cold War covert actions as a 
successful precursor to bigger operations. Crucially, all three groups do not question 
programmatic success (for better or worse), ignoring the counter-narrative that maybe the 
covert action was programmatically ineffective.63  
Assessments of the actual impact of CIA interference on the election are therefore ‘largely 
irrelevant’. Even as internal CIA historians, with access to all records, still argue about impact, the 
broader narrative is far more important: ‘In Washington’s collective imagination, the CIA had 
rescued Italy’s democracy’. As the historian David Shimer notes, ‘No proof was needed. America’s 
preferred party had won’.64 
The same applies to the bolder actions in Iran. The dominant narrative – agreed by diverse 
audiences in both America and Iran – has long been one of programmatic success: the US 
successfully removed Mossadeq.65 This narrative developed through accounts by highly salient 
characters including the CIA’s chief of the Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt; the 
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MI6 chief of station in Iran, Montague Woodhouse; and an influential CIA planner, Donald Wilber. 
Each source is questionable on its own, but together they were able to establish a narrative of 
programmatic and process success, and it is of little surprise that the power of American agency 
quickly dominated history. Counter-narratives, that internal forces were equally if not more 
important than covert action in engineering the coup or that the operation was an initial failure, 
struggled to gain traction.66  
In Guatemala, local scholars and journalists subscribed to the dominant narrative of US 
programmatic success even before details of US involvement came out in the 1960s and 1970s.67 
For Árbenz, mere knowledge of US involvement – however ineffective – was a critical factor 
persuading him to give in.68 Influential literature in the 1980s perpetuated the narrative of CIA 
power.69 Interestingly though, the material achievements were arguably far more limited – the 
official history admits that the CIA had a poor understanding of internal Guatemalan affairs, 
especially within the army officer corps. ‘Just as the entire operation seemed beyond saving, the 
Guatemalan Government suddenly, inexplicably collapsed. The Agency never found out why’. 
Crucially, CIA officers obscured such failings and replaced them with the legend that Árbenz ‘lost 
his nerve’ in the face of the American propaganda.70 Officials’ mindsets, reflective of a Cold War 
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setting which framed Árbenz as a communist and the desire to champion American prowess, 
were crucial in shaping the success narrative.  
Drawing on a wide range of secondary literature, O’Rourke claims ‘US policymakers were 
enormously pleased with the intervention, and they revived some of its techniques during 
subsequent missions in Brazil, Bolivia (twice), British Guyana/Guiana, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, and Panama’.71 For many in the US intelligence community, Guatemala ‘nurtured 
a sense of infallibility’.72 The coup therefore became a success not because it liberated Guatemala 
from a mostly imagined communist threat, but because a critical mass of salient actors 
subscribed to the CIA narrative.  
Mindsets, salient events and social pressures explain why this dominant narrative of 
programmatic success took hold across different operations and competing groups. Mindsets 
included US officials’ beliefs about the communist threat, the purpose and prowess of the CIA, 
and experience in each operation (which then informed the next). Even after the end of the Cold 
War consensus and “Golden Age”, the narrative of power and success continued – including 
amongst those criticizing US excess. For example, the Church committee – named after Senator 
Frank Church (D-ID) who chaired this Senate select committee set up to investigate CIA and other 
intelligence agencies’ abuses – described Iran and Guatemala as ‘two of the Agency’s boldest, 
most spectacular covert operations’. It highlighted how CIA operations in the 1950s were 
‘regarded as an essential contribution to the attainment of United States foreign policy 
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objectives’.73 Although tempered and qualified by a new narrative of process excess, the 
narrative of programmatic success remained dominant. Mindsets amongst critical audiences in 
the target countries included the malevolent omnipotence of the US and past experience of US 
– or other foreign – interference. This too supported perceptions of programmatic success.74  
The Italian election, the Iranian coup, and the Guatemalan coup all constituted salient 
events. They shaped observers’ interpretations and narratives of programmatic success. US 
policymakers and CIA operators wanted these outcomes and they ultimately happened, thus 
allowing observers to impose cause and effect without questioning whether the outcomes were 
actually independent from the action. Finally, social pressures included the dominance of elite 
US sources and accounts, from autobiographical narratives of potency in Iran to the myth of 
Guatemala. The perspective of practitioners, especially in a literature to which former 
practitioners – particularly US ones – have contributed more than in other sub-fields of 
international relations, is especially influential. Information asymmetry impacted interpretations 
of programmatic and process success. 
In each of these “Golden Age” cases, multiple audiences – including salient observers in 
target countries – adhere to the dominant narrative of programmatic success: meeting 
objectives, making gains, and having political impact. There is surprising convergence between 
sponsor and various audiences within target states, with both emphasizing the effect of foreign 
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interference, and in that sense, success is a self-fulfilling construction. Both sides collude in 
narratives of success, often to suit their own purposes. The narrative of programmatic success 
reassures observers on both sides, thus providing them with a sense of ontological security. From 
this perspective, past covert action “successes” help to construct mythologies that contribute to 
national security culture and identity.75 Foreign policy actors can then use these “success” stories 
‘to develop and communicate strategic narratives about the past […] and about their country’s 
identity as an international actor in order to shape their discursive environment and the 
behaviour of other actors both domestically and internationally’.76   
For US observers, “success” maintains a narrative of potency and leadership that aligns 
with the place of their country as a superpower. For the targets, and outside of the US national 
security setting, the same narrative creates a convenient imperialist scapegoat. It allowed the 
Italian left to explain successive election defeats and has ‘played a prominent role in left-wing 
attempts to construct identities of resistance and narratives of national independence’.77 
Similarly, many Iranians, from Muslim fundamentalists to secular nationalists, agree on the 
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Counter narratives challenge the notion of “Golden Age” and have largely crystallized away from 
myopic visions of programmatic “success”. Here, three clear points of contestation emerge, each 
shaped by mindsets, the salient events, and social pressures.  
The first is whether longer-term consequences should be part of programmatic 
evaluation. Former practitioners have again tried to shape the narrative here, with Richard 
Bissell, for example, claiming that the CIA was not responsible for longer-term impact and that 
covert action, like military operations, was directed to achieve short-term objectives.79 Bissell 
was promoting his own interests in claiming this, but the narrative struggled to gain much 
traction within academia with most scholars, benefiting from hindsight, taking longer term 
consequences into account.  
Such longer-term evaluation remains a matter of subjective judgement though. CIA 
officers involved in Iran, for example, insist that the stability brought about by the coup at the 
height of the Cold War was worth whatever longer-term effects might be ascribed to it.80 Others 
are far more critical, arguing, for example, that the intervention sowed the roots of modern day 
terrorism.81 This leads to counter-factual narratives that can never be proven, i.e. that the 1979 
revolution would not have happened without the earlier covert action, again highlighting the 
importance of perception.  
Second, existing narratives diverge over process, in terms of legitimacy, and over political 
dimensions of success. This was particularly the case when the Church Committee and other 
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government inquiries broadened the parameters of the debate in the 1970s. The committee 
portrayed even covert actions deemed programmatically successful as part of a broader pattern 
of procedural excess, which violated international norms and undermined the reputation of 
liberal democracy.82 Such judgements, expressed by salient figures including journalists and 
politicians, became influential in the popular and historical discourse. In particular, Senator 
Church made the infamous remark that the CIA operated like a ‘rogue elephant on a rampage’.83 
This myth permeated much negative public understanding of covert action for a long time 
afterwards.  
His remark took hold because Church, a voluble critic of the Agency, made it at a well-
attended press conference, at a time when he was running for presidency and wanted to 
politicize proceedings. Demonstrating the importance of mindsets and experience, audiences 
were receptive because it represented frustrations of segments of the US population following 
anti-war protests and multiple scandals involving US intelligence encroachments on civil liberties 
at home. The Church committee eventually found that the CIA was not out of control, but the 
rogue elephant metaphor gained traction in the popular imagination and helped construct the 
image of a potent villain.84 As noted above though, this image did not derail the broader 
programmatic success narrative. A majority of salient observers gave greater weight to 
programmatic over process and political dimensions of success. 
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The CIA clearly deemed the wider political narrative important in determining the success 
of the Guatemalan coup, so much so that it launched another covert action (PBHISTORY) to 
manipulate perceptions. This constitutes an explicit – if initially hidden – example of a social 
pressure attempting to manipulate narratives of success. Salient international actors, including 
the London Times, Le Monde, and the UN Secretary General criticized US involvement, hypocrisy 
and economic colonialism.85 In response, the CIA sought to justify the regime change by 
disseminating documents supposedly proving that the Soviets controlled Guatemalan 
communists, thereby countering the Soviet (and non-aligned) narrative that Guatemala had 
posed little threat to Washington. This CIA effort did not gain much traction in the international 
discourse, but it demonstrated the role of social pressure and potential for manipulation in the 
contest for narrative dominance.86 Although there is divergence about longer-term 
consequences, issues of legitimacy and authorization, and political ramifications, these narratives 
all take place within the same settings and use the same characters: US national security and CIA 
potency.   
The third contest is “success” for whom. Changing the setting away from US national 
security and the Cold War allows marginalized counter-narratives to emerge. 87 It challenges 
interpretations of the three dimensions of success at the core of our model. Alternative settings 
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of economics, imperialism, development or human security enable different narratives beyond 
whether and how the US achieved its goals; so too does a change in the cast of characters towards 
internal actors. Counter-narratives here offer different perspectives on the Iranian coup. The 
coup arguably set back the process of oil nationalization globally for around two decades; 
destroyed secular opposition; delegitimized the monarchy; and ‘further intensified the already 
intense paranoid style prevalent throughout Iranian politics’. It left a ‘deep imprint on the 
country’, including its collective memory, ‘popular culture and what some would call mentality’.88 
Citizens of all ideologies became more convinced than ever that ‘figures visible on the national 
stage were mere “marionettes” controlled by “foreign strings”.’89 More broadly, others have 
commented that covert action – and rumors of covert action – have contributed to a “paranoid 
style” amid the domestic politics of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central America, with 
damaging consequences for development.90  
In sum, these “Golden Age” covert actions are programmatic successes, and partial 
process successes, because salient actors – both sponsor and targets – subscribe to that 
narrative. This unearths surprising convergence in recognizing the power of the CIA, not because 
of objective evidence and an ability to isolate impact but because collusion in this narrative 
benefits both sides. Narratives of CIA success – shaped by mindsets, events, and social pressures 
– can provide a reassuring sense of continuity to policy elites. 91 From the sponsor’s perspective, 
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using covert action provides a reassuring sense that the United States is a “great power” that is 
actively shaping the world.92  In the target state, a “CIA success” provides a useful scapegoat to 
justify new – and sometimes extraordinary – policies aimed to restore a sense of physical and 
ontological security.93 Narratives are a form of political resource that assign meanings to events 
and create perceptions of reality that can mobilize groups and foster solidarity.  
These narratives of success only diverge when considering the longer-term, legitimacy, 
political or non-US implications. Success for whom? Was it worth it? Despite some divergences 
the dominant narrative continues to follow a US state perspective and points to short-term 
success but longer-term failures. However, it is important to recognize variation in 
interpretations: mindsets, salient events and social pressures vary from one observer and context 
to another.  
 
Conclusions and Implications  
 
As US competition with China increases, some scholars fear covert action is back on the agenda 
and are warning policymakers against it.94 However, such policy advice rests on shaky 
epistemological foundations; the often-cited figure that covert regime change only works 39% of 
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the time conveys a misplaced sense of certainty through its apparent precision.95 Asking how 
covert actions came to be seen as a success, failure, or something in between is an equally, if not 
more, important question than whether covert action works. How we conceptualize or construct 
success in the first place has real world implications which can lead to the use and misuse of 
policy instruments, missed opportunities, and counterproductive reactions to adversaries’ 
operations.  
This article has deconstructed covert action success in order to expose and distill 
competing criteria. It has argued that success is not absolute, but laden with subjective 
judgements. Measuring the outcomes of covert action against policy goals and asserting success 
in a completely objective manner is impossible. Instead, success is constructed through discourse 
and spans contested criteria beyond programmatic outcomes to include how covert action was 
planned and executed as well as interpretations of the broader political consequences. 
Understanding success requires analysis of narratives of all three dimensions – and these 
narratives are shaped by myriad factors.  
 Our attempt to conceptualize the evaluation of covert action success has four significant 
implications.  First, our wider-ranging dialogue between different dimensions and perceptions of 
success teases out trade-offs. Crucial when debating use of covert action, these include the 
impact of operations on institutional process and democratic norms, and the impact on broader 
political reputations. For example, successfully interfering in an election can be outweighed by 
the cost of a sponsored candidate being tainted as a perceived puppet if exposed. Likewise, 
programmatic success might be outweighed by broader political and reputational hits, as the CIA 
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worried about in the aftermath of Guatemala. Political-programmatic trade-offs are especially 
important for covert action. Similarly, conceptual clarity teases out the (often conflated) 
relationship between outputs and outcomes. For example, literature on Italy often focuses on 
the number of propaganda outputs rather than the impact they had. Paradoxically, desire for 
metrics can actually hinder operations by pushing towards easy wins, which agencies can claim 
as successes, but which come at the cost of longer-term confusion.  
Second, tracing how a covert action came to be seen as a success or failure exposes the 
construction of outcomes through political interactions. It also underlines the importance of 
perceptions and narratives in international affairs. Covert actions, such as US interference in the 
1948 Italian election, are successful if salient audiences perceive them as such. This has 
implications for how states use and respond to covert actions. Reactions to hostile covert actions, 
especially when overplaying “success”, can generate paranoia, hysteria and conspiracism. Much 
like in Iran regarding the CIA, so in the United States after 2016 the Russian hand appeared 
everywhere and parts of the American public lost faith in the state’s own liberal democratic 
institutions and ‘custodians of factual authority’.96  
Third, tracing how covert actions came to be seen as a success helps to challenge the 
dominance of the Anglosphere and state-centrism in intelligence studies. Recognizing that 
evaluations are ‘dependent on temporal, spatial, cultural and political factors’97 enables a more 
wide-ranging dialogue, more nuanced evaluations, and a more explicit recognition of power 
relations and competing perspectives. Success for whom becomes more important. This 
 
96 Rid (2020), p.11. 
97 Bovens,’t Hart and Peters (2001), p.20. 
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approach has the potential to de-centre the state in analysis of covert actions, opening space to 
consider the effects on target populations, as well as domestic public opinion. This opens new 
avenues of research that should, importantly, give a greater voice to scholars and scholarship 
from and on the Global South.98 Likewise, reducing the focus on sponsoring states gives more 
voice to domestic agency and bottom-up forces or protests. It is important to look beyond hidden 
hands – Western or otherwise - when explaining unrest and division. Intelligence scholars have 
focused too much on “hidden hands” and not enough on the “hearts and minds” these hands 
seek to manipulate. 
Mehta and Wibben, for example, suggest exploring personal narratives and 
acknowledging differences among stories and storytellers to unpack the relationship between 
security and identity. Such an approach can shed light on the impact of covert action on 
marginalized voices, such as local populations for whom covert action is not synonymous with 
foreign policy success but forms of gendered and racialized insecurity.99 
Fourth, and leading on from this, the subjective nature of covert action successes opens 
further avenues of research to link the study of covert action to broader debates in international 
relations. Our model identifies a path to develop revisionist studies that highlight the socially 
constructed nature of covert action to question dominant interpretations of the broader set of 
 
98 For a similar point, see Zakia Shiraz and Richard Aldrich, ‘Secrecy, Spies and the Global South’, 
International Affairs, 95:6 (2019), pp.1313-29.  See also Alfredo Mason, ‘La guerra fria: el caso de 
Guatemala’, Revista de la Red Intercatedras de Historia de America Latina Contemporanea, 3:4 (2016), 
pp.122-37; Zakia Shiraz, ‘Drugs and Dirty Wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South’, Third World 
Quarterly, 34:10 (2013): 1749-1766. 
99 Akanksha Mehta and Annick T.R. Wibben, ‘Feminist Narrative Approaches to Security’, Caron E. 
Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security 
(Abingdon: Routledge 2019), 48-58. 
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cases developed by pioneering historians. This approach has much potential to build bridges with 
international relations research on identity and narratives, which largely overlooks the role of 
intelligence agencies in informing foreign policy construction. Dina Rezk, for example, shows how 
western intelligence analysis developed biased views of the ‘Arab Other’ during the Cold War.100 
Priya Chacko recognizes constructions of external CIA involvement in her study of Indian foreign 
policy.101 However, much of the existing literature overlooks the role of intelligence agencies 
constructing ‘others’.102  
It also bridges with feminist approaches to security studies. In addition to the work of 
Mehta and Wibben cited above, Elspeth van Veeren argues that discourse surrounding the Global 
War on Terror has reinforced gender, racial and sexual hierarchies within and beyond special 
operator communities. This links to broader discussions of how discourse produces and 
reproduces the self (i.e. insiders and good guys) and the foreign other. The secrecy of covert 
actions can create a framing effect that reinforces structural inequalities; this is something that 
 
100  Dina Rezk, The Arab World and Western Intelligence: Analysing the Middle East (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 47. For IR research on identity and narratives see Subotić (2016); 
Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, ‘Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for 
Europe’, International Affairs, 83: 2, (2007), pp.273–288. There is also a wealth of literature on Russian 
identity and narratives which might benefit from this intelligence perspective. See for example Kari 
Roberts, ‘Understanding Putin: The Politics of Identity and Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Policy 
Discourse’, International Journal, 72:1 (2017), pp.28-55. 
101 Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2012), p.144 
102 See for example: Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, ‘Human Security: a New Strategic 
Narrative for Europe’, International Affairs, 83: 2, (2007), pp.273–288; Kari Roberts, ‘Understanding 
Putin: The Politics of Identity and Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse’, International Journal, 
72:1 (2017), pp.28-55. 
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has been largely overlooked in intelligence studies, but not in the broader study of International 
Relations.103 
Our findings may also provide new data and case studies for those examining how states 
cultivate ontological security.  The routinized practice of covert action provides a stable cognitive 
environment to the state and its elite and help to guarantee their ontological security.104 Covert 
actions themselves, as well as their outcomes, derive meaning through discourse. Highly 
mythologized, told through narratives, and shaping national security cultures, they offer fresh 
insight into how states see and present themselves on the international stage.  
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